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The dynamical mechanisms that can stabilize the coexistence of species (or strategies) are of substantial in-
terest for the maintenance of biodiversity and in sociobehavioural dynamics. We investigate the mean extinction
time in the coevolutionary dynamics of three cyclically invading strategies for different evolutionary processes
on various classes of complex networks, including random graphs, scale-free and small world networks. We find
that scale-free and random graphs lead to a strong stabilization of coexistence both for the Moran process and
the Local Update process. The stabilization is of an order of magnitude stronger compared to a lattice topology,
and is mainly caused by the degree heterogeneity of the graph. However, evolutionary processes on graphs can
be defined in many variants, and we show that in a process using effective payoffs the effect of the network
topology can be completely reversed. Thus, stabilization of coexistence depends on both network geometry and
underlying evolutionary process.
PACS numbers: 87.23.-n, 02.50.Ey, 89.65.-s
I. INTRODUCTION
Dynamical mechanisms that stabilize cooperation have in-
trigued scientists from different fields for many decades,
and evolutionary game theory has developed from a coining
metaphor to a well-established research area with a wide range
of applications from biology to behaviour [1–5]. An analo-
gous question addresses the dynamical mechanisms that can
stabilize coexistence of (biological) species or (behavioral)
strategies [6]. In a biological context: how is biodiversity
sustained? Here, cyclic coevolution has been suggested as
to support the coexistence of strategies [7–9]. But it already
has been reported that cyclic dominance alone is not enough
to stabilize coexistence of strategies [8, 10]. While space (or,
in ecological setting, niches) provides a means of stabilizing
biodiversity, it is not the only mechanism to be taken into ac-
count. One additional way of stabilization is the introduction
of a non-zero sum game, which also can stabilize finite but
sufficiently large populations [11] and results in an exponen-
tial scaling of the mean first extinction time [12].
In general, the stability of the coexistence fixed point de-
pends on several instances: firstly, on the payoff matrix
[7, 11], secondly, on the population size and the underlying
evolutionary process [13, 14], and thirdly, on the spatial struc-
ture of the population which can assume interaction topolo-
gies with the structure of a lattice or more general graphs. A
spatial discretization of coevolutionary dynamics can lead to
a stabilization of the coexistence of game theoretical strate-
gies, compared to well mixed populations [7, 8]. This cor-
responds to the effect of spatial discretization in 2-strategy
games, where – despite exceptions [15] – cooperative strate-
gies can be stabilized [16, 17]. In this direction, many works
deal with structured versions of the prisoners dilemma [18],
where it has been shown that cooperators can coexist with
defectors even in parameter regions where cooperation will
never be observed in mixed populations [19–26]. In con-
trast to these two-strategy evolutionary games, here we ana-
lyze the widely known rock-paper-scissors game (RPS) which
includes three strategies with cyclic dominance. Such three-
strategy models including cyclic dominance are well-known
in game theory and related fields [8, 9, 27–29]. In a spatially
extended system, the coexistence of the three cyclically invad-
ing strategies is stabilized, even in cases where it is not stabi-
lized in the well-mixed system [7]. – But how strong is this
stabilization? Are there differences between the stabilization
effect on different graphs and for different processes? How
does the population size influence the stabilization? To an-
swer these questions, in this paper we examine three different
update mechanisms – the frequency-dependent Moran process
[30, 31], the local update process [13], and a process adapted
from Szolnoki, Perc, and Danku [22] – and a broad range of
complex network types as underlying structures, and, for each
network type, analyze the mean extinction time (MET), i.e.
the average time until one of the three strategies has gone ex-
tinct.
II. THE ROCK-PAPER-SCISSORS GAME
We consider a population of N individuals or agents. N is
assumed to be constant all the time (although this common as-
sumption is an approximation, and additional effects emerge,
e.g., in growing populations [53]). Each individual is placed
on one vertex of a graph containing N vertices and can take
on one of the three strategies ’rock’, ’paper’, or ’scissors’. As
played on schoolyards, ’rock’ looses against ’paper’ but wins
against ’scissors’, and cyclically permutated. In game theory,
the ‘interaction kernel’ quantifying the outcome of agent col-
lisions is cast into a payoff matrix, which reads for RPS
P =

 0 −1 11 0 −1
−1 1 0

 , (1)
and we assume that we have a zero-sum RPS game. We now
can find the total payoff for a certain individual i playing strat-
egy S(i) by adding all payoffs that i gets from neighbored
nodes. With L as the adjacency matrix (whose elements Li,j
are 1 if two vertices i and j are connected by a link, and 0 oth-
erwise), we can compute the total payoff πi for an individual
2i by
πi =
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
Li,jPS(i),S(j). (2)
Assume the strategy S(i) to be α. Let us use the notation β
for the strategy dominated by α, and γ for the strategy that
dominates α, with {0, 1, 2} as numerical values that represent
these strategies. Then using the special structure of our payoff
matrix, this term can be simplified to
πi =
N∑
j=1
Li,j
(
δS(j),β − δS(j),γ
)
. (3)
This total payoff can be modified for normalization issues, as
we will describe in the next section, because the way of nor-
malization varies in the different update mechanisms, defin-
ing rules after which strategy changes occur, depending on
πi. Note that this total payoff can vary relevantly from the
case of unstructured populations. For example, consider the
case of a node i playing strategy α. Let j be the only vertex i
is connected to, and let j be the only vertex that plays strategy
γ which may dominate α so that i gets a total payoff πi = −1
although in the whole population there is only one agent that
dominates strategy α. This single agent playing strategy γ
would only have negligible influence on the payoff of i in a
well mixed population, namely, reduce it by 1/(N − 1).
III. UPDATE MECHANISMS
A. The frequency-dependent Moran process on networks
For the first update rule we have adapted the well known
frequency-dependent [31] Moran process [30]. For normal-
ization, we divide the total payoff πi by k(i) (being the vertex
degree, number of neighbors of i). So the payoff reads
πi =
1
h(i)
N∑
j=1
Li,j
(
δS(j),β − δS(j),γ
)
. (4)
Now we choose a vertex i and another vertex j, for which
Li,j = 1 holds, at random. With probability
φ
S(j)→S(i)
M =
1
2
1− ω + ωπi
1− ω + ω〈π〉 (5)
the individual on the vertex i reproduces, and its strategy re-
places the strategy of the player on the vertex j. Here ω is the
strength of selection and
〈π〉 =
N∑
j=1
Li,jπj/k(i) (6)
is the mean fitness of the relevant subpopulation, in our case,
all neighbors of i. Note that in contrast to the Moran pro-
cess in well mixed populations, 〈π〉 needs not to be 0 even for
the case of zero-sum RPS we have analyzed here (although
this still holds for the expectation value 〈π〉). Note also that
the original definition of the Moran process is slightly differ-
ent because one should choose an agent i for reproduction at
random proportional to φM . That means we are ensured that
there is a real update event in every update step, which is not
the case in our definition. Our definition is numerical cheaper
because it is not necessary to compute the payoffs for all of
the vertices in every time step, and it influences the time scale
only by a constant factor.
B. Local update process on networks
As the availability of the global information 〈π〉 to all in-
dividuals may often be unrealistic, one should also consider
processes where only locally available information is of rel-
evance to the dynamics. In the extreme case, only randomly
selected pairs of nodes compete, as in the class of local com-
parison processes [24, 32–36]. From this class, we have inves-
tigated the local update process [13] as well. Here we, again,
normalize the payoff of a vertex i by dividing it by the number
of its neighbors. Then we again choose two linked vertices i
and j. With probability
φ
S(j)→S(i)
LU =
1
2
+
ω(πa − πb)
2∆πmax
(7)
j changes its strategy to the strategy of i. Here, ∆πmax is
the greatest possible payoff difference, that is the difference
between the largest and the smallest entry in the payoff matrix.
C. SPD-process
As a third update rule we have modified a process intro-
duced by Szolnoki, Perc, and Danku [22] which one could
think of as a simplified version of the local update process at
the first view. We choose a vertex i per random and another
vertex j which is connected to i by a link also per random.
In contrast to the Moran and the local update process, both
payoffs are modified according to the rule
πi = aπi + (1− a) πi
k(i)
. (8)
(In the case a = 0 we again have the payoffs like in the other
two processes.) Now, only if πj > πi, j reproduces with
probability
φ
S(i)→S(j)
SPD = (πj − πi)/max(πj − πi) (9)
proportional to the difference of the payoffs, and the strategy
of vertex j replaces the strategy of vertex i. The maximum
in this term has to be understood as the the maximum of the
possible payoff difference that two vertices with degrees k(i)
and k(j) can have. This ensures the probability to always be in
the range of 0 and 1. One can easily compute this maximum,
so we can achieve the following:
φ
S(i)→S(j)
S =
πj − πi
2(1 + a(kmax − 1)) . (10)
Here kmax is the maximum of k(i) and k(j).
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FIG. 1: Realizations of five different types of networks with an average vertex degree of k = 4 and a total number of vertices of
N = 25. (a) Square lattice with periodic constraints. The half-links are clear illustrations of the periodic constraints. (b)
Random regular graph. Each vertex has the same degree k. (c) A connected ER-random graph. (d) Scalefree network after
Baraba´si and Albert. The nodes placed on the square in the middle are the k0 starting nodes. (e) Smallworld network after
Watts and Strogatz with p = 0.25.
IV. INVESTIGATED NETWORKS
All networks used as an underlying topology for such a
game should fulfill some common properties. They should
be connected, so that we do not have some parts of the popu-
lation not being linked to the rest of the population. Here, we
always consider undirected and unweighted (binary) graphs.
To avoid self-interactions of the agents, self-loops should be
excluded. A schematic illustration of the network types used
in this paper is shown in Fig. 1.
A. Regular lattice
The first step of complexity of placing vertices spatially –
beyond the linear chain – is a regular square (or rectangular)
lattice. Typically, each node is connected with 4 or 8 near-
est neighbors. To eliminate boundary effects, we use periodic
boundary conditions. This is a very simple, but in many cases
not realistic model, so we have analyzed some other specific
types of models that will be presented in the following sub-
sections. For a better comparability with the regular square
lattice with natural connectivity of 4 or 8, we have restricted
ourselves to graphs with an average vertex degree of 4 and 8.
B. Erdo˝s-Renyi random graph
The most frequently used model of real, not lattice-like
graphs in the past decades was the Erdo˝s-Renyi (ER) random
graph [37]. Here one starts with a graph with N nodes and
connects each pair of nodes with probability p. In this model
the probability of finding a node with degree k follows a Pois-
son distribution
P (k) =
e−λλk
k!
, (11)
where
λ = N
(
N − 1
k
)
pk(1− p)N−1−k. (12)
The graphs we have investigated are constrained in two ways.
On the one hand, they must be connected, what means that
there is at least one possibly path from each node to any other
so that we don’t have two or more groups of not interrelated
agents. On the other hand, we restrict ourselves to networks
with a mean vertex degree of 4 or 8 for better comparability
with the regular lattice. Because we will need only connected
graphs with a certain mean degree k, and because we would
find these networks only with some probability even by
adjusting p with respect to the number of nodes, we have used
the following algorithm:
1. Start with a graph G with N vertices and no edges.
2. Link randomly chosen vertex pairs if they are not al-
ready linked until the total number of edges equals Nk.
Now the mean vertex degree will equal k.
3. If the graph is connected, accept it, otherwise return to
step (1).
C. Random regular graph
A compromise between the random graph and the regular
lattice is the random regular graph with the same degree
k for all vertices but a much shorter average shortest path
length than in a lattice. For generating the random regular
graphs we have used an algorithm proposed by Steger and
Wormald [38]. This algorithm ensures to give connected
random graphs with equal degree k for all vertices:
1. Start with a graph G with N nodes (1, 2, ..., n) and no
edges.
2. Repeat the following until the set S is empty: Let S be
the set of vertex pairs {u, v} of G that are not connected
by an edge yet with both having at most degree k − 1.
Then choose a specific pair {u, v} out of S with prob-
ability proportional to
(
k − k(u)) (k − k(v)), where
k(u) and k(v) are the degrees of u and v in the graph
4generated up to now. Add the edge to G. Delete the pair
{u, v} from S.
3. If G is k-regular (that means connected and of the same
degree k for all vertices), accept it, otherwise return to
step (1).
The last step with the return statement is necessary because
unfortunately the algorithm does not exclude the possibility of
receiving disaggregated graphs (which occurs rarely) or that
the last connection possibilities are only self-loops.
D. Baraba´si-Albert scalefree network
Many real networks, primarily huge ones, are described by
the ER-model in an insufficient way. In many of these net-
works, for instance the internet [39], the WWW [40, 41], the
network of power nodes in the west of the United States [42],
the network of scientific collaborations [43], or the metabolic
network of yeast [44] one observes a degree distribution that
(approximately) follows a power law,
P (k) ∝ k−γ . (13)
Baraba´si and Albert [45] have proposed the following algo-
rithm of modelling complex real networks:
1. Start with a small number k0 vertices that are all con-
nected to each other.
2. Add another node and link it to an already present ver-
tex with probability proportional to the degree of this
vertex. Add further links in the same fashion until the
new vertex has a degree k < k0.
3. Repeat step (2) (until you have reached some value of
N you want).
In contrast to the ER-model for random graphs or the like-
wise frequently used Watts-Strogatz-Modell ([42], see next
subsection) this model incorporates two main aspects of real
networks, growth and preferential attachment. Namely, most
real networks do not have a fixed size but grow like the WWW
[40, 41]. The WWW is also an example for the preferential
attachment: When creating a new website, one will typically
try to link it to well known and popular sites to gain more at-
tention for ones own site. Because of that, the Baraba´si-Albert
network has a high density of so-called hubs. These are ver-
tices that are connected with many other nodes with relatively
small vertex degree.
E. Small-World-Network after Watts and Strogatz
Another frequently used network model is the Small-World
network. The existence of long range connections with si-
multaneous appearance of a high local cluster coefficient is
a phenomenon often obtained in real networks [46].). The
notion integrates some slightly different types of networks.
Here we have used the original model of Watts and Strogatz
[42]. In their model one starts with a circle of nodes. All of
them are connected with k nearest neighbors (k/2 in the one
direction and k/2 in the other). Afterwards, one starts with
rewiring the links, beginning with an arbitrary vertex i on the
circle. With a certain probability p, i is disconnected from its
nearest neighbor in clockwise direction and is connected to a
randomly chosen vertex j that is not already linked to i. In
this way one goes on in clockwise direction until all links to
nearest neighbors have been checked for rewiring. Then one
goes on with the second nearest neighbor, and so on, until all
links have been checked for rewiring.
For p → 0 one achieves obviously some kind of regular
lattice (that is structured in a different way that the one we
have used). In contrast to that, for p → 1 one achieves a
graph equivalent to the ER-random graph. But for interme-
diate values of p one gets networks with high local cluster
coefficients like a regular graph (or lattice), but also a small
average shortest path length like a random graph [47]. For the
sake of clarity, we have used p = 0.25 in all cases.
F. Network with Gaussian degree distribution
As a sixth type of networks, we have used a graph with a
Gaussian degree distribution. This type is a compromise be-
tween the ER-random graph and the random regular graph. To
generate these networks we have modified the algorithm used
for the random regular graph by making the designated vertex
degree k dependent of i, i = 1, 2, ..., n. For these k(i) we
have used a Gaussian distribution with a standard deviation of
k/3, where k is the designated average vertex degree. By this
choice of the standard deviation it is ensured that almost all
designated degrees k(i) are positive. We have ignored the few
occurring non-positive (negative or 0) degrees by choosing a
new designated degree in the case of such a choice.
G. Uncorrelated scalefree graph
To analyze possible effects of the vertex degree distribution
in scalefree graphs after Baraba´si and Albert on the dynam-
ics of our games, we have investigated the dynamics on un-
correlated scalefree graphs as well. For the construction of
such networks we have used the algorithm described in the
preceding subsection (IV F) with a power law degree distri-
bution identical with the distribution of vertex degrees of the
Baraba´si-Albert scalefree graph instead of a Gaussian distri-
bution. To avoid confusion, we will refer to this graph short
as uncorrelated. If we refer to scalefree graphs (without men-
tioning anything about the correlation) we always consider the
Baraba´si-Albert network.
V. MEAN EXTINCTION TIMES
We have carried out extensive simulations to obtain the
mean time until one of the three strategies has gone extinct
5when starting with each of the strategies having the same fre-
quency N/3 (this requires that N is an integer multiple of
three). After the first strategy has vanished, the game lacks
its cyclic dominance, and we return to the two strategy case
which is well known and will end up in a much shorter time in
a single-strategy steady-state because one of the two remain-
ing strategies definitely dominates the second. Note that we
measure time in units of single update steps instead of Monte
Carlo steps, where on average each agent has been updated in
one time step, so there is a factor of N between these two time
scales.
A. Mean extinction time in well mixed populations
First, let us consider the case of well mixed populations for
comparison, which is identical to the case of fully connected
graphs (that means each vertex is directly linked to any of the
N − 1 others). We have to distinguish between two cases: the
Moran and the local update process on the one hand, and the
SPD-process on the other hand.
1. Moran and local update process in mixed populations
In well-mixed populations, the Moran and local update pro-
cess have been shown in [13] to have the adjusted replicator
equation [48] and the standard replicator equation [3] as limits
asN goes to infinity. They both have a neutrally stable (for the
zero-sum RPS) fixed point in the state space of strategy densi-
ties at
(
N
3 ,
N
3 ,
N
3
)
. For any other point inside of the simplex,
both replicator equations predict neutrally stable oscillations
around this fixed point, but in the case of finite populations
the population can run out of the fixed point and the orbits
around it because of stochastical fluctuations, and end up on
the edge of the simplex S3 which is the boundary of the state
space. A point on the edge of this simplex corresponds to the
extinction of at least one of the three strategies (there are three
points on the boundary corresponding to the survival of only
one strategy). So we expect the MET of this system to tend to
infinity as N → ∞. But at this point there are still two open
questions: What is the exact scaling dependence of the MET
on N? And how does the selection strength ω influence this
dependence?
Our simulations give clear and short answers for both ques-
tions: In the zero-sum RPS game, the MET is proportional
to N2 (in single birth-death update steps, corresponding to N
Monte Carlo steps), and independent of ω (both is different in
the non zero-sum RPS case). For both processes, Moran and
local update process as well, we have found the mean extinc-
tion time text to scale as [12]
〈text〉 = 0.54(±0.02)N2. (14)
2. SPD-process in mixed populations
As this process has never been defined for unstructured
populations let us use the complete graph as a model for the
mixed population for simplicity, so that we do not have the
risk of making any alterations to this update rule if re-defining
it. Now we find that, when starting with
(
N
3 ,
N
3 ,
N
3
)
, each
node has as many neighbors of the dominating strategy as of
the dominated one, namely N/3. Because of the structure of
the payoff matrix the fitness is identical to zero for every strat-
egy and node. So the condition that the second chosen vertex
has a greater fitness than the first is never fulfilled, and one
will never observe a change in the strategy densities. For this
reason the MET becomes infinite even in finite populations (at
least when starting in the point
(
N
3 ,
N
3 ,
N
3
)
; even when start-
ing in some neighboured point in the state space we would
only achieve some conditional mean extinction time).
B. Moran process on networks
From the results of our simulations (see Fig. 2), there are
two immediate main observations: First, for some networks
biodiversity is greatly stabilized as the MET increases expo-
nentially withN , while for other networks biodiversity is only
slightly stabilized or even destabilized. Second, the MET is
no longer independent of the selection strength ω even in the
zero-sum RPS case that we have considered here. Stabilizing
effects of the underlying structure are more distinct for greater
ω.
Great stabilization of the biodiversity is only observed for
networks with a heterogenous degree distribution and strong
selection, while for networks with homogenous degree distri-
bution we have no such strong stabilization. In fact, the net-
works with homogenous degree distribution can even lead to
a slight destabilization of biodiversity for strong selection, as
the MET grows slower than N2, as we can see for the random
regular graph. Even in the cases of the small world and the
Gaussian network, which both have a small heterogeneity in
their degree distribution, we have such a destabilization. Only
for the square lattice we have a stabilization (although the lat-
tice has a homogenous degree distribution, of course), but the
stabilization is much weaker than in case of the random graph
or the two scalefree networks. For the stabilization on the lat-
tice, the large average shortest path length might play a role
(which is proportional to √N instead of logN as for random
networks [49]).
For small ω, there is not a great change in the behaviour of
the MET on all networks compared to unstructured popula-
tions (Fig. 2).
Also, the correlation strength of the network degrees has
only minor effect of the stabilization of biodiversity. The MET
for an uncorrelated scalefree graph is, in all cases considered
here, somewhat smaller than for the Baraba´si-Albert scale-
free graph, but in comparison to the other effects, mainly the
enormous stabilization impact of scalefree networks, this is
negligible.
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FIG. 2: (Color online.) Mean extinction times of the Moran process on networks. The plots are semi-logarithmic over N , and
the MET is devided by N2 for a better comparison with the result of well mixed populations and to better discern stabilizing
effects. Red circles: k = 4, ω = 0.05, orange squares: k = 4, ω = 0.40, green rhombi: k = 8, ω = 0.05, blue triangles: k = 8,
ω = 0.40, black points: well mixed population. Red circles on the upper edge of a plot in connection with a curve of a different
colour mark are only marks that the curve is going on further, but it isn’t depicted for a better presentation. Averages are taken
over a sample of 100 runs (N > 400) or 1000 runs (N = 1000).
7C. Local update process on networks
One of our main points of interest was whether the evolu-
tionary process itself influences the MET in the case of a net-
worked population. The corresponding results for the Local
Update are shown in Fig. 3. There is no qualitative difference
between the results in the Moran process and in the Local
Update process. Same as for the Moran process, heteroge-
nous degree distributions cause an enormous stabilization of
the biodiversity for strong selection (the MET grows exponen-
tially with N ), while homogenous degree distributions do not.
The MET is now dependent on the selection strength as well,
and for small ω it is proportional to N2 as in the neutral case.
The only difference is that stabilizing effects are not as strong
as in the Moran process for the same or even a bit larger ω.
D. SPD-process on networks
The SPD-process behaves completely different, as shown
in Fig. 4. We recall that for this update rule the quite gen-
eral observation that spatial discretization can lead to a stabi-
lization of biodiversity does not hold. Even ignoring this and
taking a MET scaling for large N like the N2 scaling from
Moran process and Local Update as reference, for all stud-
ied graphs except the lattice we have a destabilization, and
the MET grows slower than N2 with only small differences
between the different networks. Only in the lattice case the
MET grows exponentially with N .
Changing the parameter a has minor influence on the prop-
erties of the MET than the selection strength ω in the Moran
and the Local Update process. For degree homogenous net-
works, the MET is even independent of a. For networks with a
strong heterogeneity in the degree distribution the MET grows
with a for the same value of N .
There is also some influence of the correlation of network
degrees. For the uncorrelated scalefree network, the influ-
ence of the parameter a on the MET is not as great as for
the Baraba´si-Albert network, and the METs for the same N ,
but different a and h are closer together. But compared to the
other effects, this is again negligible.
VI. THEORETICAL APPROACH
A. Moran process
1. General case
For a version of the RPS game with constant reaction
rates it has already been shown that networks with heteroge-
nous degree distribution effect a stabilization of biodiversity
[50]. This corresponds with our simulation results so we have
adapted the approach from [50] to underpin the shown be-
haviour theoretically.
First let us define the probability density of the strategy α
on all nodes with degree k as ρα,k, whereα = (0, 1, 2). Here
we again use the notation α for an arbitrary strategy, β for the
strategy dominated by α, and γ for the dominating strategy.
Then the probability θα′ that a neighbored node of an arbitrary
vertex plays strategy α′ reads
θα′ =
∑
k′
k′pk′ρα′/〈k〉. (15)
Here pk is the probability of finding a vertex with degree k.
Dividing by the average vertex degree, 〈k〉 = ∑k kpk, as-
sures the standardization. Further, by the conservation of the
total density one of the quantities ρα,k and of θα is given so
that we can eliminate ρ2,k and θ2 using ρ0,k and ρ1,k as vari-
ables, or θ0 and θ1, respectively
ρ2,k = 1− ρ0,k − ρ1,k (16)
θ2 = 1− θ0 − θ1 (17)
The average payoff of a player of strategy α on a node with
degree k is then given by
πα,k = θβ − θγ (18)
We find that the average payoff is independent of the vertex
degree k so we can drop the index k, πα,k ≡ πα. With this we
can compute the average payoff of neighbours of a vertex
〈π〉 =
∑2
α=0
∑
k′ πα
pk′k
′
〈k〉 ρα,k′k
k
=
2∑
α=0
∑
k′
πα
pk′k
′
〈k〉 ρα,k′
=
2∑
α=0
(θβ − θγ)
∑
k′
k′pk′ρα′/〈k〉
=
2∑
α=0
(θβ − θγ) θα. (19)
By using k′pk′ρα′/〈k〉 instead of pk′ we consider that is more
likely to have a vertex with a high degree as a neighbour than
one with a smaller degree if both are equally frequent. Thus
we find the probability for a player with strategy α sitting on
a node with degree k to reproduce as
wα,k =
1
2
pkρα,k
1− ω + ωπα
1− ω + ω〈π〉 , (20)
and the rate with that a player of strategy α sitting on a vertex
with degree k conveys his strategy to a node with degree k′,
which has played strategy α′ before, reads
Tα
′→α
k,k′ =
pk′ρα′,k′
〈k〉 wα,k (21)
=
1
2
pk′ρα′,k′
〈k〉 pkρα,k
1− ω + ωπα
1− ω + ω〈π〉
For pk = δk,k0 (δk,k0 is the Kronecker symbol) this reduces
to
1
2
Tα
′→α = ραρα′
1− ω + ωπα
1− ω + ω〈π〉 . (22)
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FIG. 3: (Color online.) Mean extinction times of the local update process on networks. The plots are semi-logarithmic over N ,
and the MET is devided by N2 for a better comparison with the result of well mixed populations and to better discern
stabilizing effects. Red circles: k = 4, ω = 0.05, orange squares: k = 4, ω = 0.50, green rhombi: k = 8, ω = 0.05, blue
triangles: k = 8, ω = 0.50, black points: well mixed population. Red circles on the upper edge of a plot in connection with a
curve of a different colour marks that the curve is going on further, but it isn’t depicted for a better presentation.
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FIG. 4: (Color online.) Mean extinction times of the SPD-process on networks. The plots are semi-logarithmic over N , and the
MET is devided by N2 for a better comparison with the result of the other processes. Red circles: k = 4, a = 0.0, orange
squares: k = 4, a = 1.0, green rhombi: k = 8, a = 0.0, blue triangles: k = 8, a = 1.0.
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Here we have omitted any k-indices because there is only
one degree left. The payoffs reduce to πα = ρβ − ργ and
〈π〉 = ∑2α=0 παρα, and one obeys the hopping rates for the
Moran process in well mixed populations [11] independent of
k0. This rate describes how likely it is that a player with strat-
egy α′ is replaced by a copy of another player with strategy α
in a single time step.
Let us now consider a heterogenous degree distribution. In
the simplest case, such a distribution consists of only two de-
grees k1 and k2 with frequencies p1 =: p and p2 = 1− p1 =
1 − p, respectively. The replicator equation that we obtain
from the master equation in the limit N → ∞ for the chang-
ing of the frequency of the strategy 0 on nodes with degree k1
reads (for the methodology see e.g. [13, 51, 52]):
ρ˙0,k1 = T
1→0
k1,k1
+ T 2→0k1,k1 − T 0→1k1,k1 − T 0→2k1,k1 (23)
+T 1→0k2,k1 + T
2→0
k2,k1
− T 0→1k2,k1 − T 0→2k2,k1 .
Inserting our special degree distribution, after a longish but
straightforward calculation we find
ρ˙0,k1 = ρ0,k1
k1p
2
2〈k〉(Γ + 〈π〉) (π0 − 〈π〉1) (24)
+
k1p(1− p)
2〈k〉(Γ + 〈π〉) (Γ (ρ0,k2 − ρ0,k1)
+ρ0,k2π0 − ρ0,k1〈π〉2) .
Here Γ = 1−ω
ω
is the background fitness. 〈π〉1 = π0ρ0,k1 +
π1ρ1,k1 +π2ρ2,k1 is the mean fitness of all players on vertices
with degree k1, and 〈π〉2 correspondingly for k2. Then one
can compute the other equations in an analogical way or by
cyclically permuting the indices. For each vertex degree, one
of the equations of motion needs not to be taken into account
by the constraint ρ0,ki + ρ1,ki + ρ2,ki = 1. For k1 = k2 or
alternatively p = 1 this flattens to the well known adjusted
replicator equation in the case of well mixed populations, as
expected [13, 14]. Likewise, the fixed point of this replicator
equation at
(
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ,
1
3
)
does not alter, we now just have two
densities for every strategy. But now the velocity of the reac-
tion is directly dependent of ω because it is no longer possible
to absorbe the strength of selection by a dynamical rescaling
of time, as it is possible for well mixed populations.
But what about the stability of this inner fixed point?
Within a linear stability analysis, let us linearize the replicator
equation around its fixed point
~˙ρ = A~ρ, (25)
with ~ρ = (ρ0,k1 , ρ1,k1 , ρ0,k2 , ρ1,k2) and A being the Jacobian
of the system with Aij = ∂ρi∂ρj |~ρ=( 13 , 13 , 13 , 13 ). In our case, we
find A as


k1(p−1)p
2〈k〉
k2
1
p2
6〈k〉2Γ
− k1(p−1)p
2〈k〉
− k1k2(p−1)p
6〈k〉2Γ
−
k2
1
p2
6〈k〉2Γ
k1(p−1)p
2〈k〉
k1k2(p−1)p
6〈k〉2Γ
− k1(p−1)p
2〈k〉
− k2(p−1)p
2〈k〉
− k1k2(p−1)p
6〈k〉2Γ
k2(p−1)p
2〈k〉
k2
2
(p−1)2
6〈k〉2Γ
k1k2(p−1)p
6〈k〉2Γ
− k2(p−1)p
2〈k〉
−
k2
2
(p−1)2
6〈k〉2Γ
k2(p−1)p
2〈k〉


.
(26)
To reason about the stability we need to know the signs of the
real parts of the eigenvalues λi of this matrix, but for these
eigenvalues we derive quite complicated terms, the signs of
which cannot be easily designated (but see Appendix A). The
Routh-Hurwitz criterion as an alternative solution does not
simplyify the situation considerably.
Approximating an upper bound of the real parts of all eigen-
values, it is possible to compute a region in the parameter
space where the inner fixed point is guaranteed to be asymp-
totically stable, namely, for
0.5 ≤ p < kmax + kmin
kmax + kmin + 3
k2max
〈k〉
. (27)
For a given value of p this determines the ratio of kmax and
kmin, or, the other way round, if we want to build up a net-
work with chosen values for kmax and kmin, this inequality
tells us what frequencies of both vertex degrees are necessary
to stabilize biodiversity. So, for example, if we choose k1 = 4
and both vertex degrees should be equally frequent, k2 must
be at least 7 to fulfill this inequality. If a higher frequency of
k1 is desired, k2 must even be larger.
But as this is just a rough approximation, by inserting nu-
merical values we have found that almost all eigenvalues are
< 0, except for the trivial cases k1 = k2, p = 0 or p = 1. So
for all values except these mentioned cases, we have found the
fixed point to be asymptotically stable. Here, we have found
numerically that the real parts of the eigenvalues become more
negative as the difference of k1 and k2 grows in absolute size,
and both vertex degrees become equally likely to be found in
the network. This explains as well why the stabilization of
biodiversity is greater in the case of the scalefree graphs than
for the ER-random graph, or it is in both cases greater than
for the network with a gaussian degree distribution, which has
only as small heterogeneity in its degree distribution.
2. Small selection limit
As we have seen in the previous section, for small ω the
MET is almost proportional to N2 as in the well mixed case,
and depends only marginally on the underlying network struc-
ture. We can intuitively understand this as follows: If ω is
small, than every transition probability is ≈ 12 , and the corre-
sponding replicator equation in our system reads
ρ˙α,k = 0 (28)
for all values of α and k. Hence, each point of the state space
is a neutrally stable fixed point in the limitN →∞. Therefore
there should be no stabilization impact compared to the well
mixed case, as there each point in the simplex belongs to a
neutrally stable limit cycle, so in both cases a perturbation is
neither expected to decay nor to grow in time.
B. Local update process
Following the same scheme as for the Moran process, one
can derive similar results (see Appendix B for details). As in
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FIG. 5: (Color online.) A plot of a numerical solution of the
replicator equation for the local update process on a network
with only two different vertex degrees (eq. B2) with p = 0.5,
k1 = 4, k2 = 8, ω = 0.4, ρ0,k1(0) = 0.65, ρ1,k1(0) = 0.3,
ρ0,k2(0) = 0.3, ρ1,k2(0) = 0.1, red for the density of strategy
0 on nodes with degree k1, black for the corresponding value
on vertices with degree k2
the Moran process, a degree heterogeneity leads to a stabiliza-
tion of biodiversity, but again the eigenvalues of the Jacobian
are too byzantine for catching the signs of the real parts easily.
C. SPD-process
For this update process, we will use a simpler method to
achieve a theoretical understanding of some of the numerical
results. In the case of both chosen vertices having the same
degree, the probability for the node i to change its strategy to
the strategy of j simplifies to
WS(i)→S(j)|h(i)=h(j) =
πj − πi
2kmax
. (29)
So for the lattice and the random regular graph, where all ver-
tex degrees are the same, any dependence of a drops out. Note
that in this equation and in this whole subsection, when talk-
ing about πi we consider the not modified payoffs. For a = 1
one achieves the same term as in the case of degree homoge-
nous networks (eq. 29), independent of the network, while for
a = 0 we find
WS(i)→S(j)|a=0 =
πj
k(j) − πikmax
2
(30)
or
WS(i)→S(j)|a=0 =
pij
kmax
− πi
k(i)
2
, (31)
respectively, depending on which of the vertex degrees is
greater. If we compare the probabilities for a = 1 and for
a = 0 by computing the ratio of both, we can analyze the im-
pact of the parameter a and the underlying network structure
on the MET. We find
WS(i)→S(j)|a=1
WS(i)→S(j)|a=0
=
k(j)(πi − πj)
k(j)πi − kmaxπj (32)
or
WS(i)→S(j)|a=1
WS(i)→S(j)|a=0
=
k(j)(πi − πj)
kmaxπi − k(i)πj , (33)
respectively. If we account for the fact that πj > πi must
hold, then the first fraction is < 1 for πj > 0 and > 1 for
πj < 0. Hence, if aside from a all conditions are the same,
for a = 1 it is more likely that a strategy with a lower payoff
reproduces, if k(j) < k(i)) than for a = 0. On the other
hand under these conditions for a = 1 it is less likely that a
strategy with a high payoff reproduces, than for a = 0. In
the second case, the fraction is < 1 for πj > 0 and πi < 0
and > 1 for all other cases. Hence for a = 1 it is more likely
that a strategy with a high payoff replaces a strategy with a
smaller payoff from a node with a smaller vertex degree, than
for a = 0. And for a = 1 under this conditions it is as much
more likely that a strategy with a smaller payoff reproduces.
Taken together, for a = 1 strategies with a smaller payoff
have a bigger chance to reproduce, and they are less likely to
be replaced by a strategy with a higher payoff, than for a = 0.
Hence on degree-heterogenous networks the MET should be
greater for a = 1 than for a = 0, as it is confirmed by the
simulation results (Fig. 4).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Cyclic coevolutionary dynamics manifests an interesting
class of dynamical systems that are discussed as models to
explain long-term stabilization of coexistence of species or
strategies. In this paper we have shown that, for the coevo-
lutionary RPS game on complex networks, there are consider-
able differences in the mean extinction time (MET) between
different networks, and for different processes as well. The
simple statement “Spatial discretization stabilizes biodiver-
sity” must be refined in a more sophisticated way. While for
example in the Moran and in the local update process degree-
heterogenous networks preserve biodiversity (the MET grows
exponentially with the number N of players), in the SPD-
process they do not, and even degree-homogeneous networks
may destabilize while the lattice still stabilizes. In summary,
we have shown that, for the cyclic evolutionary RPS on net-
works, there is a striking influence on the mean extinction time
characteristics of the spatial structure and the update rule as
well.
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Appendix A: Eigenvalues of the Jacobian in equation (26)
With the help of (e.g.) Mathematica™ one can easily com-
pute the eigenvalues λi of the Jacobian in equation (26):
λ1 =− 1
12〈k〉2Γ
(
i
(
k22(p− 1)2 + k21p2
) (A1)
−3(k1 + k2)〈k〉(p− 1)pΓ +
√
c1 − ic2
)
λ2 =
1
12〈k〉2Γ
(−i (k22(p− 1)2 + k21p2) (A2)
+3(k1 + k2)〈k〉(p− 1)pΓ +
√
c1 − ic2
)
λ3 =
1
12〈k〉2Γ
(
ik22(p− 1)2 + 3k2〈k〉pΓ(p− 1) (A3)
+k1p(ik1p+ 3〈k〉(p− 1)Γ)−
√
c1 + ic2
)
λ4 =
1
12〈k〉2Γ
(
ik22(p− 1)2 + 3k2〈k〉pΓ(p− 1) (A4)
+k1p(ik1p+ 3〈k〉(p− 1)Γ) +
√
c1 + ic2
)
with the abbreviations
c1 = −
(
k22(p− 1)2 + k21p2
)2 (A5)
+9(k1 + k2)
2〈k〉2(p− 1)2p2Γ2
c2 = 6〈k〉(p− 1)p
(
p2k31 + k2(p− 2)pk21 (A6)
+k22
(
p2 − 1) k1 + k32(p− 1)2)Γ.
The real parts ℜλi of this eigenvalues are then given by
ℜλ1 = k1p
2
4〈k〉 +
k2p
2
4〈k〉 −
k1p
4〈k〉 −
k2p
4〈k〉 (A7)
−cos
(
1
2 arg (c1 − ic2)
)
4
√
c22 + c
2
1
12〈k〉2Γ
ℜλ2 = k1p
2
4〈k〉 +
k2p
2
4〈k〉 −
k1p
4〈k〉 −
k2p
4〈k〉 (A8)
+
cos
(
1
2 arg (c1 − ic2)
)
4
√
c22 + c
2
1
12〈k〉2Γ
ℜλ3 = k1p
2
4〈k〉 +
k2p
2
4〈k〉 −
k1p
4〈k〉 −
k2p
4〈k〉 − (A9)
cos
(
1
2 arg (c1 + ic2)
)
4
√
c22 + c
2
1
12〈k〉2Γ
ℜλ4 = k1p
2
4〈k〉 +
k2p
2
4〈k〉 −
k1p
4〈k〉 −
k2p
4〈k〉 (A10)
+
cos
(
1
2 arg (c1 + ic2)
)
4
√
c22 + c
2
1
12〈k〉2Γ .
Here, arg(z) is the argument of the complex number z. The
sum of the first four terms negative in each case because 0 <
p < 1 and for this reason p2 < p. The problem is the last
summand, but it is possible to make a rough approximation
of where all real parts are negative. As
4
√
c2
1
+c2
2
12〈k〉2Γ > 0 and
−1 ≤ cos(x) ≥ 1, all real parts are smaller than
k1p
2
4〈k〉 +
k2p
2
4〈k〉 −
k1p
4〈k〉 −
k2p
4〈k〉 +
4
√
c22 + c
2
1
12〈k〉2Γ (A11)
Inserting c1 and c2 and assuming p ≥ 0.5 without loss of
generality, one can approximate the fourth root in the last term
by
4
√
c22 + c
2
1 =
(
36〈k〉2(1− p)2p2Γ2
(
p
2
k
3
1 + (−2 + p)
pk
2
1k2 + (−1 + p
2)k1k
2
2 + (1− p)
2
k
3
2
)2
+
(
−〈k〉2(1− p)2p2Γ2(k1 + k2)
2
+
(
p
2
k
2
1 + (1− p)
2
k
2
2
)2)2) 14
<
(
36〈k〉2(1− p)2p2Γ2
(
p
2
k
3
1 + (2 + p)
pk
2
1k2 + (1 + p
2)k1k
2
2 + (1− p)
2
k
3
2
)2
+
(
〈k〉2(1− p)2p2Γ2(k1 + k2)
2
+
(
p
2
k
2
1 + (1− p)
2
k
2
2
)2)2) 14
<
(
36k2maxp
4Γ2(k3max(4p
2 + 2))2
+9(k2maxp
4Γ2(2kmax)
2 + (2p2k2max)
2)2
) 1
4
<
(
36 · 144Γ2p8k8max + (36Γ
2 + 4)2p8k8max
) 1
4
= p2k2max
4
√
36 · 144Γ2 + (36Γ2 + 4)2 (A12)
As the have checked numerically, the remaining root divided
by 4
√
36 · 144Γ2 + (36Γ2 + 4)2/Γ < 9 for ω < 0.45 (which
is necessary to have mathematically meaningful probabilities
between 0 and 1), so
4
√
c22 + c
2
1
12〈k〉2Γ <
3p2k2max
4〈k〉 , (A13)
and therefore all real parts are negative if
kmax + kmin > p
(
kmax + kmin + 3
k2max
〈k〉
)
, (A14)
or noted in a simplified way and remembering the assumption
at the beginning of this approximation,
0.5 ≤ p < kmax + kmin
kmax + kmin + 3
k2max
〈k〉
. (A15)
.
Appendix B: Theoretical approach: local update process on
networks
Similar as in the Moran process, in the local update process
on networks the rate with which vertices with degree k and
strategy α carry this strategy over to nodes with degree k′ and
strategy α′ is given by
Tα
′→α
k,k′ =
pk′pkk
′ρα,kρα′,k′
〈k〉
(
1
2
+
1
2
ω
πα − πα′
∆πmax
)
, (B1)
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which does not vary from the results in well mixed popu-
lations in the case of homogenous degree distribution. The
replicator equation for the model system of a heterogenous
degree distribution with only two vertex degrees reads
ρ˙0,k1 =
ψk1p
2
〈k〉 ρ0,k1 (π0 − 〈π〉1) (B2)
+
k1p(1− p)
2〈k〉 (ρ0,k2 (1 + ψ (π0〈π〉1))
−ρ0,k1 (1 + ψ (〈π〉2 − π0)))
with ψ = ω/∆πmax. The other equations are obtained anal-
ogously. Here again the position of the fixed point is not
changed compared to the well mixed case. But again it is no
longer possible to absorb the selection strength ω by a rescal-
ing of time.
A linear stability analysis leads to the matrix A


k1(p−1)p
2〈k〉
k2
1
p2ψ
3〈k〉2
− k1(p−1)p
2〈k〉
− k1k2(p−1)pψ
3〈k〉2
−
k2
1
p2ψ
3〈k〉2
k1(p−1)p
2〈k〉
k1k2(p−1)pψ
3〈k〉2
− k1(p−1)p
2〈k〉
− k2(p−1)p
2〈k〉
− k1k2(p−1)pψ
3〈k〉2
k2(p−1)p
2〈k〉
k2
2
(p−1)2ψ
3〈k〉2
k1k2(p−1)pψ
3〈k〉2
− k2(p−1)p
2〈k〉
−
k2
2
(p−1)2ψ
3〈k〉2
k2(p−1)p
2〈k〉


.
(B3)
The eigenvalues of this matrix are again given by
λ1 =− 1
12〈k〉2 (−3(k1 + k2)〈k〉(p− 1)p (B4)
+2i
(
k22(p− 1)2 + k21p2
)
ψ +
√
c1 − ic2
)
λ2 =
1
12〈k〉2 (3(k1 + k2)〈k〉(p− 1)p (B5)
−2i (k22(p− 1)2 + k21p2)ψ +√c1 − ic2)
λ3 =
1
12〈k〉2
(
2ik21ψp
2 + 3k1〈k〉(p− 1)p (B6)
+k2(p− 1)(3〈k〉p+ 2ik2(p− 1)ψ)−
√
c1 + ic2
)
λ4 =
1
12〈k〉2
(
2ik21ψp
2 + 3k1〈k〉(p− 1)p (B7)
+k2(p− 1)(3〈k〉p+ 2ik2(p− 1)ψ) +
√
c1 + ic2
)
with the abbreviations
c1 = 9(k1 + k2)
2〈k〉2(p− 1)2p2 (B8)
−4 (k22(p− 1)2 + k21p2)2 ψ2
c2 = 12〈k〉(p− 1)
(
p2k31 + k2(p− 2)pk21 (B9)
+k22
(
p2 − 1) k1 + k32(p− 1)2)ψp.
The real parts of this eigenvalues are given by
ℜλ1 = k1p
2
4〈k〉 +
k2p
2
4〈k〉 −
k1p
4〈k〉 −
k2p
4〈k〉 (B10)
−cos
(
1
2 arg (c1 − ic2)
)
4
√
c21 + c
2
2
12〈k〉2
ℜλ2 = k1p
2
4〈k〉 +
k2p
2
4〈k〉 −
k1p
4〈k〉 −
k2p
4〈k〉 (B11)
+
cos
(
1
2 arg (c1 − ic2)
)
4
√
c21 + c
2
2
12〈k〉2
ℜλ3 = k1p
2
4〈k〉 +
k2p
2
4〈k〉 −
k1p
4〈k〉 −
k2p
4〈k〉 (B12)
−cos
(
1
2 arg (c1 + ic2)
)
4
√
c21 + c
2
2
12〈k〉2
ℜλ4 = k1p
2
4〈k〉 +
k2p
2
4〈k〉 −
k1p
4〈k〉 −
k2p
4〈k〉 (B13)
+
cos
(
1
2 arg (c1 + ic2)
)
4
√
c21 + c
2
2
12〈k〉2 ,
which is very similar to the corresponding result in the Moran
process (it varies only slightly in c1 and c2). Searching for
an upper bound for the real parts of the eigenvalues, we even
derive the same inequality as for the Moran process
0.5 ≤ p < kmax + kmin
kmax + kmin + 3
k2max
〈k〉
. (B14)
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